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Intimations of a Spiritual New Age: 
I. The Spiritual Emergence and Personal Tragedy of a Universalized 
Christian Mysticism in the Life and Work of Simone Weil   
Harry T. Hunt
Brock University
St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada
This is the first in a projected series on the envisionings during the crisis years of the 1930s 
of a future spiritual New Age consequent on the coming globalization of an individualist, 
capitalist, technologically driven world economy. In very different ways Jung, the philosophers 
Bergson and Heidegger, the historian Toynbee, and Wilhelm Reich, foresaw an emergent 
New Age consistent with a post-modern secular culture. Others such as Teilhard de Chardin, 
Krishnamurti, and Gurdjieff anticipated their own potential universalizing of more mystical 
aspects of the world religions. Simone Weil’s version of an essentialized mystical Christianity 
is part of the latter attempts, including her proposed synthesis with a mystical Platonism, 
along with her versions of Buddhism, Taoism, and Hinduism. Eschewing traditional 
doctrines of Resurrection, after-life, and final judgement, Weil offered her own transpersonal 
understanding of a “negative theology” of the unknowability of God other than through 
states of Grace, based on the individual experience of “affliction” uniquely exemplified by 
Christ on the Cross, and the beauty of the natural order. Her personal struggles throughout 
her highly original mystical realization, still seen by many as an exemplary guidance toward 
a Christianity of the future, and its tragic “meta-pathological” inversion in the last years of 
her short life, attest to challenges entailed in non-traditional transpersonal developments 
that might anticipate a spirituality of the future.
Born to a French secular Jewish family, and dying prematurely at the age of thirty-four in 1943, Simone Weil, well known initially in Europe for 
her neo-Marxist political writings, underwent a major 
spiritual opening beginning in 1938. She formulated 
these experiences in terms of a potentially universalized 
mystical Christianity, without doctrines of Resurrection, 
personal afterlife, Annunciation, Apocalypse, or final 
judgement—blended with Greek Platonism, the 
Bhagavad-Gita, and aspects of Buddhism into a new kind 
of “implicit faith.” It is a strikingly original “negative 
theology” based on God’s inherent unknowability and 
felt absence, except for the descent of Grace in moments 
of total suffering and surrender most purely exemplified 
by “my God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me” 
(Matthew 27: 46) of Jesus on the Cross (Weil, 1947/2002, 
1951/2005, 1951/2009). The postwar publication of her 
spiritual essays, letters, and notebooks had a considerable 
and still ongoing impact on contemporary religious 
thought, along with much controversy over her lifelong 
emotional struggles and their apparent inversion of her 
earlier spiritual enlightenment in the final year of her 
life in ways that many, then and now, have regarded as 
consciously self-destructive and suicidal.
 Weil, who considered her experiences as 
ontologically real and transcendent, would not have 
agreed with this present approach to the psychology 
of spirituality as a higher or abstract development of 
emotional intelligence, in the sense of Max Scheler 
(1926/1970) and G. H. Mead (1934) on mystical 
realization as a universalized sympathy, and further 
developed as a developmental epistemology of the 
transpersonal by Hunt (2016). Such an approach 
might offer its own understanding of the suffering and 
purgation inherent to the major spiritual traditions, in 
that an abstract synthesis of feeling and a decentering 
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from egocentricity must not only address the broader 
human condition but will necessarily activate and 
attempt to assimilate previous affective trauma and 
unresolved personal issues. This is understood not in 
the sense of Freud (1930) and some recent versions of 
attachment theory (Rizzuto, 1979) in which God as 
spiritual Absolute is reduced to a projection of the primal 
parents, but rather in the sense of W. R. Bion (1970) 
and Almaas (2004), in which the all encompassing 
nature of transpersonal states will resonate with 
unresolved issues from early childhood in their similar 
quality of an encompassing totality and diffuseness. 
Ideally “metabolized” and healed within direct mystical 
realization, earlier trauma can also imprint and distort 
subsequent spirituality in terms of what Maslow (1971) 
saw as the spiritual “meta-pathologies” of despair, 
grandiosity, and withdrawal, and William James (1902) 
termed the potential “theopathies” of “geniuses of the 
religious line”—and which in the extreme, as in the case 
of Weil, may shut down into an unresolved “dark night” 
(Hunt, 2007).
Simone Weil and a New Age Spirituality
There is also a broader socio-historical context from which to understand Weil’s version of a 
universalized mystical Christianity. In hindsight, at 
least, the 1960s, 70s and 80s might be considered their 
own circumscribed “era” rather than the beginnings of 
the New Age many thought at the time.1 While left with 
highly specific understandings of psychedelic therapies, 
Eastern spiritualities, spontaneous ecstatic states, 
neo-shamanism, and the developing neurocognition 
of meditation, the longer term planetary “age” of 
spiritual renewal often anticipated seems inevitably put 
forward into a more distant future by the narrowing 
economic impact of globalization and the shrinking 
of the previously expanding educated, individualistic 
middle classes that the sociologists Weber (1922/1963) 
and Troeltsch (1931/1960) thought foreshadowed a 
futural sensate or inner-worldly mysticism to replace the 
increasingly secularized Judaic-Christian prophetical 
religiosity (see Hunt, 2003, 2010). Indeed the recent 
reactive fundamentalisms within Christianity, Judaism, 
Islam, and even Hinduism attest to the economic 
pressures that would postpone any such predictions.
 While not in any way to minimize the 
continuing contributions of an increasingly sophisticated 
transpersonal movement within the human sciences, 
it may be more helpful for any longer term New Age 
anticipations to look back to the more intuitive and 
schematic formulations that cluster in the 1930s—
perhaps called forth all the more accurately and 
powerfully out of the diffuse premonitions, in the face 
of the distorted quasi-religions of Nazism and Stalinism, 
of an unprecedated carnage to come. It was beginning 
in this time that a series of seminal figures, including 
Toynbee, Jung, Heidegger, Reich, Gurdjieff, and 
Krishnamurti, as well as the Catholic priest Teilhard de 
Chardin and Simone Weil herself, began to respond to 
a widely perceived loss of meaning and purpose, only 
to become more fully obvious in a beginning post-war 
globalization, with a depth and insight less visible in the 
more specifically focused era to follow. It may be time for 
their reconsideration if we are to understand the multiple 
strands—both religious and secular—that would need 
to be synthesized in any future planetary New Age called 
forth to compensate and reconcile a more impersonal 
technologically driven globalization that seems destined 
to leave a large portion of humanity superfluous to its 
administration (Harari, 2016).
 There were two major strands in these attempts 
extending from the 1930s through the 1950s. The one was 
more secularly conceived and seeking a new postmodern 
understanding of the spiritual (Jung, Heidegger, Reich). 
The other was more intuitively religious and seeking the 
essentializing, universalizing, or right simplification of 
the mystical or “perennial” center of the major world 
religions. It is here that Weil becomes central in her 
insistence on the ontological reality of her mystical 
Christianity. Convergences among and between these 
two strands become especially noteworthy in their 
intuition of any future spirituality that might redeem 
and balance where the planet seems headed.
 To begin with attempts at religious 
universalization, with respect to Christianity, key figures 
include not only Weil herself but the Catholic priest 
and paleontologist Teilhard de Chardin (1959, 1964)—
the major works of each only published posthumously. 
Where Weil would emphasize an individual suffering 
and grace separated from and transcending society, 
Teilhard foresaw a future planetary civilization whose 
pervasive materialism would be best reconciled through 
Christian versions of a divine incarnation of all persons, 
whose equality of personhood would be best unified 
through an Agapic or compassionate love for which an 
essentialized Christianity could provide the template.2
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 There is the similar and roughly contempora-
neous universalizing of Hasidic Judaism by Martin 
Buber (1949, 1957/1970), and Scholem’s (1941/1961) 
presentation of Kaballah, along with the Gurdjieff-
Ouspensky movement (Ouspensky, 1949) and Idries 
Shah (1964) offering essentialized versions of Islamic 
Sufism.3 Krishnamurti’s (1971; Landau, 1935/1964) 
universalizing of Hinduism as ongoing attention/
acceptance of the ongoing moment, “without hope 
or desire,” is strikingly similar to Weil (1951/2009) 
on the transformative power of meditative attention, 
while the earlier Theosophical movement seems to have 
been the first to proclaim a coming New Age (Hakl, 
2013). Meanwhile Weil herself (1956) was aware of 
Suzuki’s (1933) initial presentation during those years 
of a generalized Zen Buddhism, seeing its no-self of 
meditative practice as similar to her own experiences of 
inner emptiness. She already strongly agreed with the 
notion of a “perennial philosophy.”
 Weil would never have cited the more primarily 
secular psychologist C. G. Jung and his naturalized 
understanding of an inherent “biological” capacity for 
numinous-mystical experience in terms of his collective 
unconscious and its archetypal imagination. Yet Jung 
(1959, 2009) independently shared with Weil a strong 
influence from an earlier Gnostic Christianity—for 
her Marcion and the Cathars—and both were equally 
preoccupied with the Book of Job as the most direct 
precursor to Christianity and the Cross (Jung, 1958; 
Weil, 1951/2009). Jung (1960), in association with the 
Eranos conferences that grew up around him in those 
years (Hakl, 2013), also began an interest in tribal 
shamanisms, dreams, and mythologies, while Weil 
was developing her own parallel fascination with the 
“implicit faith” she saw running through cross cultural 
mythologies and European folk and fairy tales.
 The philosopher Heidegger (1919/2004; 
1927/1962) in these same years had already derived his 
ostensibly secular existential phenomenology of human 
existence, with its inherent opening to a numinous 
“primordial Being experience,” from Meister Eckhart 
and Augustine. Where Weil analogously utilized Plato 
and Pythagorus, Heidegger (1938/2012) advocated 
a return to a radical reinterpretation of the Greek pre-
Socratics to herald his “new beginning” and futural “last 
god.” Heidegger saw himself as addressing a crisis of 
spiritual loss in modernity consequent on the ongoing 
triumph of a technology and “machination” that 
would someday reduce personhood to an economic 
commodity—a version of Weil (1947/2002; 1951/2005) 
on the “mechanism” of society that, absent a higher 
Grace, turns persons into the “things” of an endless 
dominance. Heidegger and Jung, coming from a political 
conservatism that saw their brief initial fascination in 
Nazism (see Hunt, 2003), and Weil, coming from a neo-
Marxist left, all became preoccupied in the 1930s and 
1940s with a sense of cultural uprootedness and loss of 
spiritual ground in the modern West. They all tried to 
foresee its potential renewal—Weil in her final The Need 
for Roots (1949/2002), Heidegger in his The History of 
Beyng (1940/2015) and Bremen Lectures (1949/2012), and 
Jung in Modern Man in Search of a Soul (1933). Heidegger 
and Jung also shared with Weil an active interest in 
Buddhism and Taoism (Parkes, 1987; Jung, 1958).4
 Finally, and to contextualize in hindsight these 
independently overlapping strands of a future New Age, 
it was during this time that the historian Arnold Toynbee 
(1946, 1956, 1957) was formulating his view of pan-
regional universal states—Persia, Rome, China, India—
producing the similarly inclusive world religions destined 
to have their still later far broader appeal and impact. Like 
Weber (1922/1963), Toynbee understood the coming 
capitalist-technological civilization as the secularization 
of a Christianity originally based on a divine incarnation 
into the material world, with a resulting implication 
of the sacredness and social equality of individual 
personhood. For Toynbee the extreme materialism and 
individual isolation of a coming future world order can 
only be made humanly tolerable through a new and 
universalizing spirituality, to avoid the danger, strongly 
felt by Weil (1951/2005) as well, of idolizing the power 
structure of that society itself. Toynbee concluded that 
such a spiritual renewal would have to involve a synthesis 
of the mystical cores of the world religions, especially 
a Christianity attuned to the sacredness of personhood 
and the Eastern traditions of meditative realization. He 
saw their shared emphasis on the necessity of humility 
and love for fellow humans, along with the inevitability 
of moral suffering and human limitation before the 
sense of something beyond and transcendent. Yet such 
a synthesis would also have to follow naturalistic lines 
acceptable to such a future technological civilization—a 
view consistent with Troeltsch and Weber on a future 
“sensate” or this-worldly mysticism for the West. Here 
Toynbee, also echoing Jung earlier, followed Bergson’s 
(1907/1944) understanding of mystical experience as 
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the direct amplification and expression of a spontaneous 
“life energy.”
 While Weil herself (1949/2002) rejected 
any such Bergsonian/Nietzschean naturalistically 
understood spirituality as an empty pragmatism—a 
“pink pill” of vitality (p. 248), it was Wilhelm Reich 
(1949/1973), the last of these New Age precursors of the 
thirties and forties, who formalized Bergson’s life energy 
into a cosmic “orgone energy”—potentially measurable 
and the “scientific” basis for traditional mystical 
experience. Reich (1953) would share with Weil an 
extreme emotional suffering from societal rejection, not 
to mention his final imprisonment, and so came to his 
own final identification with the living Jesus, understood 
with Nietzsche (1888/1954) as a Dionysian affirmation 
of life itself. Weil herself (1956) saw the parallels between 
the myth of Dionysius/Osiris and Jesus, and shared with 
the later Reich a view of a science that should be based 
not on inner mechanism but on the expressive outward 
beauty of its patterning and recurring “form constants” 
at all levels of the physical universe.
 These then are some of the spirituality fragments 
that might be re-activated in a future globalized culture of 
technology in which many persons would find themselves 
economically superfluous and so forced into exactly 
the situation of detachment, passivity, and experiential 
receptivity that would favor a more interior openness. 
While many, as increasingly seen today, would drift into 
patterns of withdrawal and self-destructive drug use, there 
would be sufficient persons of high creativity to synthesize 
some or all of these influences into a new more planetary 
spirituality. Simone Weil’s own original essentializing of a 
mystical Christianity already shows some of this synthesis, 
along with the deep personal suffering in attempting its 
enactment in the world as she found it.
The Mystical Theology of Simone Weil
Consistent with the traditional purgation/illumination, death/rebirth structure of mystical 
and shamanic openings (Laski, 1961; Walsh, 2007), 
Simone’s opening to the direct sense of an encompassing 
presence of Jesus, beginning in 1938, came only when 
the severity of her physical exhaustion and migraines, 
while recovering from her attempt to bypass neo-Marxist 
theory with her own factory work, had reached the point 
where she was contemplating suicide. She concluded 
that God’s grace and its redeeming joy can only descend 
in such states of extreme “affliction” beyond ordinary 
suffering, where all personal will is surrendered to a 
“soul killing despair” (Weil, 1947/2002). Only then can 
God’s emptiness, since God is non-existent within space 
and time, fill the inner void left of the ordinary self. Her 
later notebooks (1950/1970, 1956) show her well aware 
of the resonance here with the Buddhist noble truths of 
suffering, no self, and shunyata.5
 Weil formalized her experiences in terms 
of a negative theology—itself evocative of Eckhart, 
Kabbalah, and Ibn ‘Arabî—in which creation is 
understood as God’s withdrawal in order that existence 
could be. Firmly rejecting the implicit pantheism often 
associated with such understanding, she saw the physical 
universe and ordinary human life as thereby ruled by a 
“metallic,” amoral, mechanistic necessity—symbolized 
by a physics of “gravity.” Our personal self is part of that 
mechanism, and Grace cannot appear within us if we are 
attached at all to self or social world, but only when we 
become emptied, and so mirroring the God of creation. 
Only with that surrender to non-being, which is forced 
on us by the direct experience of a dull, despair-inducing 
“metallic coldness” in the pure mechanism of affliction, 
can the Godlike emptiness and silence within be loved 
by the similarly non-existent God of creation, and so be 
filled with joy.
It is in affliction itself that the splendor of God’s 
mercy shines . . . . If we fall to the point where the 
soul cannot keep back the cry “my God, why hast 
thou forsaken me” . . . we end by touching . . . the 
very love of God. (Weil, 1951/2009, p. 44) 
God can love in us only this consent to withdraw 
in order to make way for him, just as . . . our creator 
withdrew in order that we might come into being. 
(Weil, 1947/2002, p. 41)
 Weil, in a way reminiscent of Almaas (2004), 
insists that we cannot fill the “holes” of suffering with 
imaginary consolation or religious dogma of any kind, 
other than complete surrender to one’s pain. Otherwise 
we do not empty ourselves to be like God, and it is 
this ultimate unknowability and emptiness that makes 
ordinary religious belief a “hindrance to true faith”: 
In this sense atheism is a purification. . . . Among 
those men in whom the supernatural part has not 
awakened, the atheists are right and the believers 
wrong. (Weil, 1947/2002, p. 115) 
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Significantly for what will later unfold for her, Weil 
also insists that we cannot choose the Cross, it must 
be inflicted. Otherwise it becomes the deliberately 
sought imaginary consolation of martyrdom, with 
a false certainty of redemption or afterlife, and so an 
unconscious “idolatry.” So for Weil the death on the 
Cross is more divine than any consoling dogma of 
resurrection. The anticipatory joy and certainty of the 
martyr is not the despair of the Cross.
 Weil (1950/1970) also has her own version 
of spirituality as intrinsic to the human condition, an 
inherent capacity that must unfold in some way— 
idolatrous or not—in ages religious and secular:
One has only the choice between God and idolatry. 
. . . For the faculty of worship is in us, and it is either 
directed somewhere into this world, or into the other. 
. . . If one denies God, either one is worshipping him 
unknown to oneself or else one is worshipping . . . 
things of this world [and] . . . imagining the attributes 
of Divinity in them. (p. 138)
Here would be her echo of spirituality as inherent 
intelligence, and her rejection of all views of its supposed 
evolutionary anachronism.
 Although Weil’s theological formulation of 
suffering can sound extreme, it is actually its own version 
of more recent research on the settings associated with 
spontaneous ecstatic states and peak experience. Taylor 
(2013) finds personal crisis to be by far the most frequent 
setting or trigger for ecstasy. Next in frequency comes the 
beauty of physical nature, and while it may contradict her 
views on its coldness and indifference, Weil found a divine 
beauty in the Greek and especially Pythagorean sciences of 
physical and mathematical form. While only occasionally 
mentioning the more tangible beauty central to a Thoreau 
or Emerson, she understood the beauty of the patterns 
and forms in nature as inspired by their “obedience” to 
divine wisdom.6 The third most frequent setting for 
ecstatic experience is meditation, and here Weil discusses 
a “total attention” to one’s unfolding situation, which she 
also compares to the “suchness” of Zen Buddhism. If that 
attention is “without memory, hope, or desire” it allows 
the “I” to disappear into a “thy will be done”—necessary 
both for the acceptance of suffering and for the awareness 
of beauty within Creation. Thus in terms of the overview 
of research on the settings for spontaneous ecstasy 
(Taylor, 2013; Laski, 1961), Weil offers the framework 
for a complete mystical system. James (1902) might well 
have regarded her as a major example of his spontaneous 
“genius of the religious line.” 
 That said, and not surprisingly for time and 
place, there is a darker, in some sense Gnostic and “world 
rejecting” aspect running all through her writings—
with the world entirely a place of cold mechanism 
and cruelty. Absent is the traditional Judaic-Christian 
respect for individual personhood. The personal is 
also seen as entirely mechanical, based on relations 
of dominance and self esteem. Closest to the sacred 
within personal life is “mother love,” but tellingly for an 
understanding of her own life (below), even it is finally 
“only an image. [It] wears out if all the conditions for 
its renewal are lacking” (Weil, 1950/1970, p. 127). It 
would be the personal that would remain her lifelong 
difficulty. Accordingly a personal after-life would be 
pointless, since there is no transcendental reality to the 
individual life:
The Last Judgement will be like this—the soul . . . 
becomes suddenly convinced beyond all possibility 
of doubt that all … [its] ends and actions during life 
were illusions, including God . . . . It re-lives … all 
the actions of its life, after which, in most cases, it 
is seized with horror, desires to be annihilated, and 
disappears. (Weil, 1950/1970, p. 152)
 Unlike Scheler, Durkheim, or Mead, who saw 
spirituality as an abstract intelligence based on the inner 
form of society itself (see Hunt, 2016), Weil (1951/2005) 
adopts Plato’s view in The Republic of society as the 
“Great Beast,” a barrier to the Divine greater even than 
carnal desire of the body. For Weil it is the same as 
Revelations’ “beast of the apocalypse.” Social virtues can 
seem to approach the truth, but all are ultimately false, 
apart from humility: 
The almost inevitable trap is the social one. 
Everywhere … the social feeling produces a perfect 
imitation of faith, that is to say perfectly deceptive. 
(Weil, 1951/2009, p. 129)
We will see below how she might have arrived personally 
at the extremity of such views, but Weil is definite that 
nothing offered in the social order is worth living for. 
Genuine love for others, central to her own personal 
altruism, must be for the Godlike void within them: 
“Apart from this kind of love, all human relationships 
are ghoulish. To love someone means to love drinking 
his blood” (Weil, 1950/1970, p. 285).
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 Accordingly it becomes clear why she could 
not join the Catholic Church, despite her lengthy and 
agonized discussions with Fathers Perrin and Thibon 
(1952/2003), and fervent wish to do so. It was for 
her finally a social organization. In her final writing 
(1949/2002), she makes clear that despite the inner truths 
of mystics like Francis of Assisi and John of the Cross and 
the unjustly persecuted Marcion and Christian Gnostics, 
the Church of Rome had transformed the Grace of God 
into the rule of the Roman emperor:
[Rome] adopted Christianity only after emptying 
it of its spiritual content. Under their rule, every 
human activity without exception became something 
servile  . . .  . God [becomes] the infinite equivalent 
of a Roman slave-holder. (Weil, 1949/2002, pp. 275, 
293)
And slavery for Weil was a social debasement that 
distorted and deformed the soul, rather than opening to 
any higher Grace.
 Herein emerges an unresolved paradox in this 
mystical theology that Father Thibon (2003) saw as a 
conflicted dualism, and which would indeed close in on 
her in the final months of her life. Weil exalts God while 
devaluing Creation, and while for Thibon she attempts 
to resolve this by the paradox of a world empty of God 
betokening the higher in-existence of God’s emptiness, it 
does not explain the dedication of her continuing social 
and political involvements after her spiritual opening. 
She added an exhausting period as a farm laborer to her 
earlier factory work, replaced her initial pacifism in 
the face of an emerging Nazism with dedication to the 
French resistance, celebrated the beginning collapse 
of the French colonial empire, and finished her widely 
respected writings of political theory with The Need for 
Roots—written at the behest of the French government in 
exile as part of its plan for a post war national culture. Why 
continue to work within the Beast for a social amelioration 
that can never finally succeed? Her only direct address of 
this seeming contradiction of her continuing dedication 
to a social order whose higher value she utterly rejected 
comes from her notes collected in Gravity and Grace 
(1947/2002):
We must eliminate affliction as much as we can from 
social life, for affliction only serves the purposes of 
Grace, and society is not a society of the elect. There 
will always be enough affliction for the elect. (p. 158)
So Weil separates the spiritual significance of individual 
person and society. The proper locus for a potential 
mystical spirituality is the individual and his/her 
affliction, while economic hardship, warfare, and 
starvation on the level of mass society can only debase 
and distort that very potential within each person—
including finally herself.
The Life of Simone Weil
It should not be surprising to see in Weil’s non traditional struggle toward a New Age mystical 
Christianity similar meta-pathological issues also found 
in related transitional figures such as Jung, Reich, and 
Heidegger (Hunt, 2003). Weil added her own long term 
personal issues to the inevitable conflicts stirred up by 
her highly original spiritual realization.
“An Impression of Strangeness and Melancholy” 
 A sequence of early traumas in attachment 
and basic trust echo forward through Weil’s life—only 
partially and temporarily alleviated in her later openings 
to Grace. While not in any way explaining what 
amounts to a highly original universalizing of a mystical 
Christianity, they reflect continuities of personal 
meaning that can become all the more destabilizing 
where genuinely new ecstatic opening must lack 
institutional support and the longer established safety 
and security of tradition (see Hunt, 2003). In the end 
it was the very intensity and ambivalence of her later 
attempts to join the Catholic Church that show how 
inwardly alone she had become.
 Petrement (1976), her closest long term friend, 
learned from the family that when Simone was six months 
old—an especially significant period for early infant-
mother attachment—severe illness in her mother caused 
an abrupt stoppage of nursing, although she continued 
to be visible at a distance for the baby. The impact seems 
to have been severe, with Simone, hitherto healthy and 
developing normally, from then on often sickly, with 
long term difficulties in sleeping, food aversions, and 
anxieties over eating which meant that until the age 
of three solid foods had to be ground up and given by 
bottle. A second traumatic layering occurred when at 
four she was hospitalized with appendicitis, leaving a 
residual and long remembered sense of betrayal over her 
mother deceiving her over where she was going. Around 
the age of six she began to deny herself candies and 
desserts after learning of the suffering of the soldiers in 
World War I. By itself this would chiefly be evidence of 
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an early ethical precocity, had it not begun her later adult 
pattern of anorexia and self starvation over the suffering 
of workers and the colonized third world.
 It is important to remember that very young 
children who undergo trauma, especially as intensified 
by heightened emotional sensitivity (Miller, 1997), will 
blame themselves for their pain, often developing an 
extreme sense of guilt and inadequacy—perhaps further 
attested in Weil by her childhood explanation, after 
hearing about “germs,” for avoiding physical contact 
“owing to my extreme disgustingness” (Petrement, 1976). 
At the same time her later childhood family relations, 
according to Petrement, were unusually warm and full of 
a playful humor. She became especially close to her older 
brother, with whom she strongly identified, and with 
whom she shared a joint mischievousness, and an equal 
intellectual precocity.
 This more idyllic interlude came to an end with 
a severe adolescent crisis, beginning at age 14, when 
in contrast to her brother, who later became a gifted 
mathematician, she failed her initial exam to enter the 
École Nationale, and withdrew into a “bottomless 
despair.” Despite her later success as a student of 
philosophy and political theory, she emerged from this 
period permanently changed. She became strikingly 
solitary, with what Father Thibon (2003) later called 
her “impression of strangeness and melancholy”—and a 
pattern of behavior at least reminiscent of an Asperger’s 
continuum, with a physical clumsiness, marked social 
awkwardness, and intensifying food aversions. There was 
also a rejection of all things bodily in the form of her 
lifelong genderless clothing, minimalizing of her actual 
attractiveness, and a seemingly permanent avoidance of 
sexuality. Once in university, she engaged in her insistent 
political discussions with a dogmatic inflectionless 
monotone, and was largely avoided by most fellow 
students as arrogant and dismissive (Petrement, 1976).
 Nonetheless, and of some significance for what 
was to follow, others, becoming better acquainted, 
saw the altruism and self sacrifice of a “secular saint.” 
Certainly many later thought so (Rees, 1966; Petrement, 
1976).7 Yet she also found her own outward social 
awkwardness extremely painful. She later described the 
extreme humiliation she had always felt when others 
found this amusing, comparing it to hens automatically 
attacking any wounded member of the flock. She wrote 
to Father Perrin how she would “take a knife and cut 
out the friendship without warning” whenever she saw 
their laughter as a more conscious cruelty—which by 
implication she was often forced to conclude (Weil, 
1951/2009, p. 112). One begins to understand her later 
view of society as Beast.
 Beginning in 1934 Weil shifted from her by 
then well known neo-Marxist political writings, well 
regarded by such as Bataille (Suriya, 2002), to her direct 
engagement with the conditions of factory work. Her 
physical slowness and clumsiness, combined with a 
continuing self starvation, and deep upset at the absence 
of human dignity of such work, led to her exhaustion 
and collapse, and the first of her mother’s several later 
interventions and enforced recovery in the family home. 
Her mother had to intervene again after her abortive 
insistence on joining a fighting unit during the Spanish 
civil war, with her fellow soldiers greatly relieved when 
her severe cooking injury ended her obtuse insistence 
on endangering their combat missions with her physical 
awkwardness. It was during these years that her chronic 
migraines and near-starvation induced exhaustion 
were so severe that she contemplated suicide. And it 
was during a recovery trip with her mother to Italy in 
1937, now unable to return even to teaching philosophy 
owing to her permanent exhaustion, that she began 
to be deeply moved by church liturgy, music, and the 
passion of the crucifixion. This led to her first mystical 
openings to the felt presence of Jesus while reciting the 
Lord’s Prayer:
At times the very first words . . . transport [me] to 
a place outside space. . . . Space opens up . . . Filling 
every part of this infinity, there is silence, a silence 
. . . more positive than that of sound . . . Sometimes 
[then] Christ is present with me in person. 
(Petrement, 1976, p. 439)
By 1942 she had fully articulated her original version 
of a universalized mystical Christianity, along with its 
synthesis with Plato, Stoicism, and aspects of Eastern 
meditative traditions.8 The sustained inner joy of these 
experiences at least temporarily alleviated the worst of 
her migraines.
The Gradual Closing 
of an Original Spiritual Opening
One would expect that the purgation/illumination structuring of major spiritual openings must re-
evoke similarly diffuse earlier personal and childhood 
issues as part of their potential assimilation and 
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healing. So it is not surprising that in addition to her 
special fascination with the Eucharist, her writings and 
notebooks are full of imagery and metaphor based on 
hunger, food deprivation, an infant crying for its absent 
mother—all evoking her sense of an absent God who 
only redeems a deprivation truly accepted:
If a soul cried to God . . . like a new-born child whom 
its mother forgets to feed . . .  . May those cries which 
I raised when I was a week or two old continue 
incessantly within me for that milk which is the seed 
of the Father . . .  . Treat the lower part of the soul 
like a child which one leaves to cry until it is tired 
and stops. In the whole universe nothing pays any 
attention to it . . .  . When this has been impressed on 
them many times a note of despair comes into their 
cries; they are weary before they begin their crying. 
(Weil, 1950/1970, pp. 99, 230-231)
God’s absence here below is the same thing as the 
secret presence upon earth of the God who is in 
heaven . . . . [His] very silence as something infinitely 
more full of significance than any response. (Weil, 
1951/2005, p. 199)
Here the presence of God is felt as the void or silence 
of his absence, just as when an infant’s cries for nursing 
must go unanswered while a loving mother is still both a 
concerned presence and an absence.
 It is important to stress that these themes of early 
attachment imprinted within Weil’s life and writings 
should not be seen as somehow the cause of her spiritual 
opening, within which they might rather have been 
finally reconciled and redeemed. One could remove all 
such imagery without in any way changing the structure 
of her mystical theology—while Eckhart and Ibn ‘Arabî 
echo her similarly absent/inexistent God with no reason 
to posit any particular childhood or social context for 
them. Where these themes of infant deprivation and 
childhood abandonment do become causal is not in her 
spiritual opening itself but in its later closing—such that 
she rejects all social support and finally starves herself to 
death.
 By the time she had relocated to New York, to 
escape with her parents Vichy France, and was applying 
to work with the French government in exile in London, 
her earlier states of joy and grace shift, along with the 
increasing severity of her headaches, into the despair 
of what might be regarded as a premature Dark Night. 
She prays for the wisdom to accept God’s abandonment 
“to the pitiless necessity of matter and the cruelty of the 
devil” (Weil, 1950/1970, p. 103). Father Thibon (2003) 
would later suggest, based on her letters, that the earlier 
detachment he had so admired had been replaced by an 
“indifference from exhaustion” and that her intensified 
self-preoccupation and unconscious pride in her own 
suffering had created a “loss of balance” and “vertigo.”
 Max Weber (1922/1963) in discussing the sort 
of “this worldly” mysticism Weil is attempting to enact, 
stresses its characteristic “broken humility”—since 
heightened openness and sensitivity must unfold not 
in monastery or wilderness but amidst the frustrations 
and barriers of everyday social existence. Genuine 
spiritual humility seems to have a quality of gentleness, 
humor, and ironic self-acceptance often associated with 
Taoism (see Giles, 1947). A danger, in terms of the 
transpersonal psychology of Almaas (2004), becomes 
the confusion of that humility with a more personal 
identity of deficiency and inadequacy. Here an earlier 
sublimation of felt deficiency into the inner emptiness 
of mystical poverty—as in Weil’s view of her “extreme 
difficulty in carrying out the simplest action” as a gift 
of Grace (Weil, 1956, p. 300)—can descend back into 
an unconsciously intensified self hatred. Thus we find 
what many have regarded as her truly awful prayer 
of self sacrifice, while waiting to leave for London, in 
which, to forebear from quoting it directly, she prays for 
paralysis, loss of all sensation, mental dementia, and loss 
of any capacity to love or care for others, all in order to 
become a “nothingness” finally “devoured by God” as 
“nourishment” for those who are afflicted.
 Once in London in 1943, and writing The Need 
for Roots for the French government in exile, her personal 
issues intensified. Despite her earlier understanding that 
God’s Grace cannot be sought through any deliberate 
martyrdom, she had conceived a secret mission in which 
she would be dropped behind enemy lines in France 
to help the Resistance. Her response to the repeated 
observation that her social awkwardness and physical 
appearance would entail not only her own, essentially 
suicidal, death but that of anyone else involved, was met 
only by deep hurt, anger, and bitterness.9 She insisted 
on buying her own parachute anyway and threatened 
to kill herself if her carefully worked out plan was 
ever undertaken without her. Finally she resigned the 
position, one that had been rather exceptionally granted 
to her, in protest.
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 A diagnosis of tuberculosis, which her doctor felt 
was curable if she would begin to eat adequately, which 
she refused to do “while France is suffering” (Petrement, 
1976), necessitated her hospitalization and growing 
weakness. In the end she died of cardiac arrest from 
overall weakness a few days after turning her face away 
from her visiting friend and former supervisor, saying 
to him that he “had not been a good enough friend” 
(Petrement, 1976, p. 533). One gets the sad impression 
of a kind of attempted emotional blackmail, that in the 
absence of the rescuing mother forced by the war to 
remain in New York, became an irreversible and terminal 
anorexia.10 In her own earlier terms, she had chosen a 
lesser martyrdom in an attempt to coerce a higher Grace.
Conclusions
These considerations of the life and work of Simone Weil raise a complex array of issues: transpersonal, 
more purely personal and interpretive, historical, and 
the cognitive and social bases of spirituality—both as an 
intrinsic human capacity and for any New Age to come. 
 1) Given the genuine brilliance and widespread 
influence of Simone Weil’s mystical and potentially 
universalized Christianity, it is impossible to avoid the 
conclusion that something truly terrible happened here. 
Her last years became a startlingly direct illustration of 
what Almaas (2004) has termed flight to transcendence 
and the transpersonal psychologist Welwood (2000) 
spiritual bypass, in which a major spiritual opening leads 
to an escape from and even dissociation of personal 
issues, rather than their assimilation and healing. That 
would have been the optimal outcome of a spiritual 
crisis associated with traditional mystical/shamanic 
development, not for nothing termed purgation/
illumination, and often compared to an induced psychosis 
(Walsh, 2007). Where issues of personal trauma and 
dilemma are not assimilated the result must be the sort 
of distortion and shutting down of realization we see at 
the very end of Weil’s life. This becomes the perpetual 
risk of any major and original spiritual realization in its 
larger attempt at the transformation and redeeming of 
collective human suffering.
 2) Still, what if Simone Weil actually was a 
saint? Perhaps she also needs to be considered in that 
light, whether in a traditional revelatory sense or in 
terms of a precocity of the inborn temperament of 
a later spiritual intelligence, akin to the prodigies of 
music or mathematics. Many have thought so, both 
before her spiritual opening in terms of her ethical and 
political altruism, and afterwards in the originality of 
her mystical theology (Rees, 1966; Petrement, 1976). 
It follows that such a saint—however conceived—
will be especially sensitive to human suffering. To the 
extent that patterns of neurosis and psychosis are the 
ubiquitous final common pathways of suffering, saint-
hood will create its own exacerbation of these patterns 
as its higher by-product—precisely in the sense that 
Maslow (1971) understood the “meta-pathologies” of 
self actualization and James (1902) wrote of specifically 
spiritual pathologies as “theopathies.” Here genius, 
and Weil as in James’ terms a “genius of the religious 
line,” will create its own pathologies as much as, and/or 
attendant with, the other way around.
 Weil’s social awkwardness and obtuseness then 
become less examples of an Aspergers-like continuum 
than the consequence of a hyper-sensitivity and capacity 
for attentive absorption in the implicit foundations of 
social consciousness that, with Wittgenstein (1969) and 
the social theorist Alfred Schutz (1962), must normally 
remain as an implied and tacit background if we are to 
function within the everyday pragmatic social order. Weil 
(1956) herself seems to have had some such intimation:
The extreme difficulty that I often experience in 
carrying out the simplest action is a favour that has 
been granted me. . . . One must not ask that this 
difficulty should disappear; but on the contrary 
ardently desire . . . for the grace to be able to make 
use of it. (p. 300)
Here her social peculiarities and “impression of 
strangeness” becomes what both allows and is also the 
result of a rare capacity for a meditative awareness into 
the roots of social connection, including the high price 
of individual moral rightness in the face of the largely 
unconscious “might” of social opinion and the tacit 
actualities of power—as in the reality of Weil’s Beast.11
 Such an analysis is not to deny, but may even 
entail, an actual incapacity for personal relations and 
understanding of specific others, not resolved by her 
spiritual opening and perhaps intensified. Both her long 
term friend Petrement (1976) and Father Thibon (2003), 
while deeply respectful of the altruism of the sustained 
help she so often offered to those she encountered, also 
saw her severe limitations in personal empathy. She 
tended to project her own mentality onto those she 
assisted, failing to perceive them as separate individuals 
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in their own right. Indeed, personality and social relations 
are reduced to “mechanism” within her understanding 
of a mystical Christianity. This impersonality seems 
especially ironic if any future syncretism of Christianity 
with Eastern meditative and naturalistic New Age 
traditions, while it might reflect Weil in dispensing 
with a personal after-life, would need to include what 
many have seen as a uniquely Christian emphasis on the 
sacredness of individual personhood. Perhaps tragically, 
it is this respect for the unique individual, so evident in 
the synoptic gospels (see Hunt, 2012), the Sufi path of 
return (Toussulis, 2010), and Almaas (2004) on “personal 
essence,” and for Weber (1922/1963) secularized within 
his globalized “spirit of capitalism,” that is missing from 
Weil’s Christianity.
 3) In seeking to understand what finally shut 
down Weil’s essentialization of a Christian mysticism, 
as its own partial intuition of a spiritual New Age so 
similarly foreseen by Teilhard de Chardin and Toynbee, 
it is important to realize that in addition to whatever the 
distortions of her spirituality that would impinge on Weil 
from the encompassing diffuseness of early trauma, one 
must also add, on a societal level, the diffuse foreboding 
throughout the 1930s created by the disarray and pending 
destruction leading into World War II. Weil, herself 
Jewish, is not the only progenitor of a futural New Age 
during that time to run together and succumb to a 
confusion of personal and collective passions. Where 
Weil, on the political left, comes to see her own personal 
martyrdom as solution to a collective spiritual crisis, 
Heidegger and Jung, on the more conservative right, at 
least for a time confused their own personal grandiosity 
with a mythically romanticized version of National 
Socialism (see Hunt, 2003). In all three one sees versions 
of a “flight to transcendence” to escape both personal and 
social disarray.
 Weil herself understood the war as portending a 
larger spiritual crisis for the West. While still in the south 
of France, she writes:
What is happening to humanity at the present 
time is like what happens to a man in whom 
affliction has, from without, partially killed the “I.” 
Contemporary events are in process of destroying 
in mankind as a whole part of the energy available 
for the transmutation into spiritual energy, and 
there is no way of repairing this loss. Contemporary 
events are an affliction, and that is an unalterable 
fact. We have got to contemplate this affliction in all 
its bitterness and without consolation, while loving 
God as the author of all things—amongst which this 
very affliction—and at the same time as the author 
exclusively of good. (Weil, 1956, p. 352)
She goes on to speculate that if these “blind forces” were to 
destroy Christianity in its present form, “new revelations” 
would follow, since the historical Jesus should be included 
with Lao Tzu, Buddha, Krishna of the Gita, and John 
of the Cross within the framework of any notion of a 
divinely inspired human incarnation.12
  4) That conclusion would also follow on 
the view of spirituality as the abstract level of a basic 
social-personal intelligence, juxtaposed in all human 
cultures against an intelligence of physical “things” 
and technology—Weil’s Grace vs. gravity—whose 
maximum abstraction is based on mathematics—also 
with its own sense of infinity and the limitless (see Hunt, 
2009, 2016). These two intelligences, in each culture 
and era of history, are in varying and shifting degrees 
of balance or imbalance, integration in a unitive world 
view or secularized separation. These intelligences are 
both logically distinct—ultimately rooted, with Dilthey 
(1883/1988) in the separation of causal explanation and 
empathic understanding—but co-dependent on each 
other in their inner process. 
 Given their common roots in Piagetian sensori-
motor bases of action, whatever the physical sciences 
learn of the universe, the technological implications 
of their methods gear back into a purposive telelogical 
human order of “use.” Correspondingly, it appears from 
the tradition of holistic cognitive psychology extending 
from Werner and Kaplan (1963) and Arnheim (1969) 
to Lakoff and Johnson (1999) that our capacity to 
represent all levels of feeling, including the inner light 
of mystical experience, rests on the self-referential re-
use of physical metaphor. This re-use is rooted into 
the etymologies of words for inner experience in all 
languages and extended into each culture’s ongoing 
metaphysical reassignment of its understanding, 
empathically rendered, of the physical universe (see 
Hunt, 2009, 2016). The metaphoric reanimation of the 
physical—as in “warm” feelings and hopes “kindled”—
on a more abstract level becomes the basis for the 
“nature mysticism” of traditional shamanism, Emerson 
and Thoreau, and Weil herself (1968) on the beauty of 
natural form as God’s wisdom.
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 Formal religion can thus be understood as each 
culture’s attempt at an encompassing self representation 
of its version of the human condition—symbolically 
reflecting the necessarily metaphoric existentials of 
feeling in terms channelled within its particular socio-
economic organization and its understanding of the 
surrounding physical universe rendered as empathically 
animated metaphoric mirror. That self representation is 
all encompassing in intent, but necessarily partial and 
intrinsically incomplete, since no self-referential formal 
system can logically encompass itself (Bronowski, 1971; 
Hunt, 2009, 2016). The necessary cultural relativity of 
the more specific levels of such religious understanding, 
in partial contrast to their more universal mystical or 
numinous felt expressions, means that, with Weber 
(1922/1963) and Sorokin (1957), the major religions 
must undergo periodic secularizations, and a loss of their 
intrinsic function to convey a sense of larger purpose and 
meaning for human existence. This will occur when socio-
economic conditions and a corresponding understanding 
of the physical universe undergo extensive enough 
changes to fall outside the self-reflective metaphors of the 
traditional religion.
 These cyclic periods of secularization and loss 
of any larger felt meaning in human existence, and 
dichotomous reactions of fundamentalist revival vs. the 
New Age numinosities of original visionary movements, 
have until modernity remained centered within the 
differing ethnic regions of the major world religions of 
the first “axial age.” However, Heidegger (1949/2012) and 
more recently Harari (2016) foresee, along with many in 
the popular media, a new and unprecedented “planetary” 
era in which previous cultural traditions become the 
anachronistic residues of a technological explosion that 
uses both natural and human reality as “commodity” for 
a globalized and increasingly elitist capitalist economy, 
its only limitations resting on fast approaching ecological 
constraints on the planet itself. Meanwhile a digital 
revolution of artificial intelligence and expert systems has 
reached the point where many foresee perhaps billions of 
people as “surplus” and without meaningful function in 
present socio-economic terms (Harari, 2016).
 Given the present view that human spirituality, 
and its cultural formulation as religion, is intrinsic to 
human symbolic intelligence, as a more abstract, albeit 
difficult to achieve and synthesize Piagetian formal 
operations in affect (Hunt, 2016), such a massively 
globalized and historically unprecedented intensification 
of secular-material values will at some point inspire and 
require a similarly globalized spiritual New Age. It is 
this that Weil (1956), Jung (1964), Toynbee (1946, 
1957), Reich (1949/1973), and Heidegger (1940/2015) 
all anticipated. Heidegger (1949/2012) suggested that 
the future extension of technology and “machination” 
would in itself eventually give rise to a collective sense 
of the “uncanny”—since that which had been created by 
us for our own increasing convenience and control will 
have come to encompass and control our own humanity. 
Since the uncanny is itself the most primitive level of 
numinous feeling, this would betoken a renewed sense 
of the awe, wonder, and humility basic to Rudolf Otto’s 
(1917/1958) felt core of the spiritual—whose most full 
development appears in the nondual mysticisms as the 
most abstract fruition of the traditional religions (Otto, 
1932/1962). In short those figures are foreseeing a new 
axial age on a planetary scale as an inherent response to the 
growing imbalance of person and thing intelligences in our 
exaggeratedly material and “sensate” age—in Heidegger’s 
terms a futural “new beginning” and advent of a “last god.”
 It may become an irony of the isolating effects of 
billions of “surplus” persons in a technologized, digitally 
automated economy that it produces just the conditions, 
in terms of Weber’s typology of religious movements, for 
the more individualized forms of this-worldly mysticism, 
transpersonalism, and neo-shamanisms and their 
emphasis on the direct experience of numinous ecstasy, 
rather than the more communal prophetical-ethical 
traditions. While the loss of meaning on a collective 
level also must create the schizoid detachment and social 
disengagement that both Sass (1992) and Deleuze and 
Guattari (1987) saw as the “schizophrenogenic” nature 
of modern culture, along with widespread social anomie 
and the self-destructive use of anomie intensifying drugs 
such as cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine, it would 
also allow other individuals to cultivate the more creative 
meditative, neo-shamanic, and psychedelic methods 
that would be central to a spiritual New Age. 
 It is in this more generalized context of a new 
sensate or this-worldly mysticism foreseen by the later 
Heidegger (1940/2015), Jung (1964), and Toynbee 
(1957) that Weil can be seen as foreshadowing the sort of 
universalizing of Christian mysticism and its incarnating 
“on earth as it is in heaven” that would go with related 
universalizings of Hinduism by Krishnamurti, Sufism 
by Gurdjieff, and Buddhism by much of transpersonal 
psychology. This would indeed be a New Age whose 
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actual time of arrival as “age,” not “era,” would be as 
uncertain in terms of global economics, politics, and 
ecology, as the pressures toward it—in human sciences 
terms at least—become a more or less predictive certainty.
 One of the great virtues of the life and work of 
Simone Weil is to show just how difficult that transition 
would be, and its likely relevance to our own very 
worldwide crisis and the collective affliction many have 
seen as well under way.
Notes
1.   The present author may not be alone, based on the 
major developments in transpersonal psychology and 
consciousness studies beginning from the 1960s, in 
anticipating that these would open into the spiritual 
New Age earlier heralded by figures as diverse as 
Jung, Heidegger, Toynbee, Reich, and Krishnamurti. 
But the continued separation of transpersonal and 
consciousness studies from the mainstream human 
sciences, with whatever inclusion restricted to more 
circumscribed neurocognitive and questionnaire 
methodologies, has left instead a sense of “something 
was supposed to happen, but did not.” 
  For this author there has dawned a certain 
clarity in coming to distinguish the concept of 
“era,” as in that of the 1960s and beyond, from the 
longer term concept of an “age.” Any calculation 
of the latter must be based on the span of centuries 
and the unknown impact of socio-economic and an 
unprecedented technological transformation (Harari, 
2016). Teilhard de Chardin (1964), anticipating 
such a futural New Age, suggested that the initial 
effects of such globalization would be exactly the 
exacerbation of regional, ethnic, and religious rivalries 
we see concurrently. The timing of a new planetary 
spirituality under such conditions must remain 
intrinsically uncertain, while still fully plausible—to 
the extent that spirituality is the higher development 
of a social-personal intelligence needed to convey 
a larger context of collective purpose and meaning 
(Hunt, 2016).
2.  The Church prohibition of the publication of 
Teilhard de Chardin’s major works until after his 
death followed from the biological basis of his New 
Age speculations on the future “planetization” of a 
“super-consciousness” or “omega point,” synthesizing 
the world religions within a broadly Christianized 
spirituality. He understood such an omega point 
as the human evolution of Bergson’s (1907/1944) 
life energy. Unlike a related usage of Bergson by 
Wilhelm Reich (1949/1973), de Chardin pictured 
this naturalization of religion as an actual biological 
evolution of consciousness—a questionable view 
also taken up by Wilber (1995), and in contrast to 
the more parsimonious sociocultural understanding 
of any such development by Weber (1922/1963), 
Sorokin (1957), and Toynbee (1946/1957);  see also 
Hunt (2003, 2010).
3.    Weil had extensive discussions on the nature of 
mystical experience, while exiled in the south of 
Vichy France, with Rene Daumal, one of Gurdjieff’s 
major French followers (Petrement, 1976).
4.  While Jung (1958) and Heidegger (Parkes, 1987) 
studied Buddhism and Taoism in more detail 
than Weil’s more impressionistic comparisons 
with her Christian Platonism, all three fall short of 
more recent transpersonal studies of these Eastern 
traditions. The point here would be that their 
more sophisticated understandings are less likely 
to translate directly into any future planetary wide 
spirituality. It would be their more selective “creative 
misunderstanding” and simplification that may 
better forecast the broader syncretisms of a more 
distant future.
5.  There has been debate in later discussions of Weil 
over any cultural “anti-Semitism” in her distaste 
for the violence and destruction in much of the 
Old Testament, and her avoiwedly, albeit original, 
Christian theology (Petrement, 1976; Yourgrau, 
2011). It is important to note, however, that her 
family, while agnostic, considered itself Jewish, she 
did not finally convert to Catholicism, and she often 
cites with deep appreciation the Psalms, Proverbs, 
and especially the Book of Job, which with Jung 
(1958) later, she sees as a direct anticipation of the 
Cross. There is some risk of historical anachronism 
in applying post-holocaust understandings of anti-
semitism to the complexities and range of Jewish 
identity in pre-war Europe. 
6.    Anticipating the more recent work of Pierre Hadot 
(2006), Weil rejected a modern science of “inner 
mechanism” for a return to a science of pattern and 
form. For Weil (1951/2005,1968) this would be a 
Pythagorean science based on an original Greek 
understanding of geometry and mathematics. 
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A case for its plausibility has been addressed by 
Morgan (2005).
7.    In this regard it is interesting to compare Weil, in 
the years before her mystical opening, to two other 
secular Jews of that era, Ludwig Wittgenstein (here 
see also Yourgrau, 2011) and Franz Kafka, both of 
whom exemplified in conduct and sensibility what 
one might term the abstract form of Max Weber’s 
“this-worldly” mystical attitude (Shields, 1993; 
Janouch, 1971), but without the direct ecstatic 
realizations that would later dominate Weil’s life. 
In all three, one finds a secular mysticism of the 
sacredness of everyday reality. This recurrence in a 
secular context of a spiritually oriented life, without 
any culturally supportive system of belief and ritual, 
is consistent with a view of spirituality as its own 
intelligence—a formal operations in affect difficult 
to fully realize even with traditionally established 
cultural guidance (Hunt, 2016).
8.  The conceptual rigor of Weil’s integration of these 
multiple traditions and the precise logic of her 
crossrelating of her key concepts of love, grace, 
suffering, affliction, attention, and existence, along 
with the non dogmatic force of these writings, 
has over time attracted the deeply respectful 
commentaries of Wittgensteinian linguistic 
philosophers such as Drury (1973), Winch (1989), 
Phillips (1993), and Rhees (2000). These authors 
also tend to agree on her personal similarities to 
the austere intensity of Wittgenstein’s own inner 
spirituality (Shields, 1993).
9.   Given her long fascination with the Bhagavad-
Gita (Yutang, 1942), wherein a pacific Arjuna 
struggles with God’s will that he go to war, and her 
commentary from her notebooks (Weil, 1956, p. 
145) that an emptiness truly attuned to God’s grace 
will not come from renouncing action itself, but 
rather from any attachment to the fruits or outcome 
of that action, it seems plausible to conclude that 
for her it was not the concrete results of her suicide 
mission that would matter, but only its value as 
a gesture to inspire others. Certainly this is the 
spirit of some more general passages on the war in 
her final The Need for Roots. Yet she seemed happy 
enough to include the inspiratory deaths of her 
fellow underground members as well. It is difficult 
to see her mission as other than her own choice of 
the martyrdom she had earlier so rejected, hoping 
instead that her inevitable capture and execution 
would force a final descent of God’s Grace—which 
she had earlier better understood as beyond either 
choice or compulsion.
10.  Petrement (1976) did suggest that by the time of her 
final diagnosis, with recovery dependent on a return 
to normal eating, Weil’s progressive anorexia may 
have made this physiologically impossible during 
those last weeks.
11.  On a personal note, perhaps shared by some readers, 
who am I to judge? Analogous to research articles 
that must alert the reader to any vested interest 
of the author, a life-history analysis such as this 
should similarly acknowledge any similarly relevant 
“counter-transference.” Accordingly, what I do know 
is how similar my own childhood and infant traumas 
are to Weil. My own version of first seeing her Beast 
of the social seems best epitomized in my stunned 
watching of several childhood “friends” laughing at 
and mocking the local “retarded” boy weeping in 
the street over the death of his just run-over dog. I 
can certainly see how Weil’s early awareness of the 
suffering within society could leave one “ill at ease,” 
socially awkward, and “detached.” So in the spirit 
of vested counter-transference, this author must also 
confess his deep personal distress over Weil’s final 
inversion of her spiritual insights and experiences 
of Grace. It underlines the intrinsic vulnerability 
of a spiritual intelligence, and, not withstanding 
her own more deep seated interpersonal difficulties, 
makes me fear for us all.
12.  Consistent with Weil’s mystical Christianity and her 
rejection of the Roman dominion that had falsely 
eliminated the earlier diversity of competing Gnostic 
Christianities, Toynbee (1956) suggested that any 
universalist revival of Christianity in a civilization of 
the future would only be fully recognizable to these 
earliest historical followers. Weil herself had already 
bypassed the dogmatic exclusivities of both Roman 
Church and Reformation, which for Toynbee had 
originally blocked the wider historical acceptance of 
Christianity by non-Western cultures. It would be 
the secularized capitalism and individualism of the 
West that later became the basis for our contemporary 
socio-economic globalization (Toynbee, 1956), 
at least outwardly separated from what Weber 
(1922/1963) famously saw as the Protestant roots of 
his “spirit of capitalism.”
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